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Same-Sex Marriage and Simulacra:
Exploring Conceptions of Equality
Heather Lauren Hughes*
The prospect of same-sex marriage has provoked divergent responses
from gay rights proponents. Some consider the right to marry an essential
part of equal protection and the single most important step towards equal-
ity for gay people.1 "Equality" in this context means consistent legal
treatment for all regardless of sexual orientation, in hopes that the exercise of
legal rights will force greater acceptance of lesbian and gay people.2
However, other pro-gay activists warn that declaring equal rights is an
assimilation decree: a demand that gays and lesbians embrace institutions
modeled on the heterosexual, monogamous relationship and achieve equal
treatment only as analogous to heterosexual "counterparts."3 Still others
criticize the idea of identity politics itself as reinforcing minority catego-
ries defined through marginalization and promoting an essentialized vi-
sion of minority groups that suppresses diversity and inequalities within
categories.4
* B.A., University of Chicago, 1995. J.D. candidate, Harvard Law School, 1998.
I would like to thank the editors of the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law
Review, Professor Gerry Frug, and Terry Hughes for their invaluable help.
I See, e.g., ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL 185 (1995) (stating that "[i]f
nothing else were done at all, and gay marriage were legalized, ninety percent of the
political work necessary to achieve gay and lesbian equality would have been
achieved"); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 123-82
(1996) (building constitutional arguments for same-sex marriage); Tom Stoddard, Why Gay
People Should Seek the Right to Marry, in LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE 13 (Suzanne
Sherman ed., 1992).
2See SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 113; BRUCE BAWER, A PLACE AT THE TABLE: THE
GAY INDIVIDUAL IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 28-29 (1993); David L. Chambers, What If?: The
Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples,
95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 450 (1996).
3 See, e.g., URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY: THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY AND
LESBIAN LIBERATION (1995) (arguing against "mainstreaming" and for fundamental trans-
formation of existing social institutions in pursuit of greater gender, racial, and economic
justice); Paula L. Ettlebrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in LESBIAN
AND GAY MARRIAGE, supra note 1, at 20, 21 (arguing that marriage will constrain gays
and lesbians, make them more invisible, force assimilation, and undermine the goals of
gay liberation).4 See, e.g., WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, IDENTITY\DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIA-
TIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX 65-66 (1991); JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, DEMOCRACY ON
TRIAL 85 (1995); SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 149, 151; VAID, supra note 3, at 286; Shane
Phelan, The Space of Justice: Lesbians and Democratic Politics, in SOCIAL POSTMOD-
ERNISM: BEYOND IDENTITY POLITICS 332, 333 (Linda Nicholson & Steven Seidman eds.,
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Strategies to secure equal rights for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals
within the existing legal order move along one trajectory towards an
equality defined in reference to that order.5 Simultaneously, questions
about the efficacy of the existing legal order as a means of social trans-
formation, 6 about how the social construction of the individual informs
and limits agency, and about what the latter means for political activism7
persist, implying that the goal of equal rights for homosexual and bisexual
people might be hopelessly conservative and ultimately stagnating to true
social transformation. This dissonant cacophony presents two questions:
What does "equality" among people of different sexual orientations mean?
What forms of equality are possible?
1995) (emphasizing diversity among lesbians and criticizing "traditional identity politics"
for positing an "intimate connection between one's sexuality and one's political sympathies
or 'true interest'); Jane S. Schacter, Skepticism, Culture and the Gay Civil Rights Debate
in a Post-Civil-Rights Era, 110 HARV. L. REV. 684, 697-717 (1997) (book review) (arguing
that although their approaches differ radically, both Sullivan and Vaid question the utility
of a traditional civil-rights model that places at the center of equality struggles laws
banning discrimination based on aspects of identity like race, gender, and sexual orienta-
tion).5 See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (lth Cir. 1997) (upholding the Georgia
Attorney General's decision to withdraw a job offer made to a woman who married
another woman, on grounds that employing her could disrupt working relationships and
create confusion in Bowers's office); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C.
1995) (holding that the word "marriage," when used to denote a legal status, refers
only to relationships between one man and one woman); Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL
694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (holding that Hawaii did not demonstrate a
compelling state interest in denying same-sex couples the right to marry); Rutgers Council
of AAUP Chapters v. Rutgers, the State Univ., 689 A.2d 828 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997) (upholding denial of health insurance coverage for Rutgers employees' same-sex
partners on the basis that they are not "spouses" under New Jersey law); Baker v. State,
complaint filed with Vermont trial court July 21, 1997 (on file with the Harvard Civil
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review) (involving three same-sex couples who have sued their
respective municipalities in Vermont seeking marriage licenses). See generally Jane S.
Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equiva-
lents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283 (1994) (providing an overview of anti-discrimina-
tion statutes).
6 See Schacter, supra note 4, at 686 (arguing that Sullivan and Vaid's skepticism of
the traditional civil rights model reflects doubts about the capacity of law to secure
equality); see also RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANcIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS: SOCIAL
REFORM AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION xvi (1994); CORNEL WEST, The Role of
Law in Progressive Politics, in KEEPING FAITH: PHILOSOPHY AND RACE IN AMERICA 235,
235 (1993).
7 See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDEN-
TITY 1-3 (1990); CONNOLLY, supra note 4, at 44-48; Ettlebrick, supra note 3, at 20, 22;
Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color at the Intersection of
Title VII and the NLRA. NOT!, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 395, 485-86 (1993) (arguing
that race and gender are "socially constructed categories established and maintained
through relations of power and powerlessness").
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Same-Sex Marriage and Simulacra
This Note applies Jean Baudrillard's concept of simulacrum s to the
institution of marriage in general and the Defense of Marriage Act9
("DOMA") in particular. This Note is not meant to be a thorough reading
or complete application of Baudrillard's philosophy. Rather, it extrapo-
lates one concept from his work Simulacra and Simulations and uses it
to reassess the same-sex marriage debate.
The concept of simulacrum asserts the absence of external referen-
tials. It posits that subjects (the subject of marriage, for example) are not
constituted by, and do not originate in, any objective reality beneath the
endless representation and simulation engaging them. A simulacrum de-
scribes complete continuity between real and imaginary, model and sub-
ject, map and territory, abstraction and actuality. Baudrillard describes it
as "the generation of models of a real without origin or reality: hyperreal.
The territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it."10 As such, the
idea of simulacrum challenges real/imaginary distinctions in two comple-
mentary ways. On one axis, it subverts the concept of "real" by negating
the existence of any actual substance (upon which the idea of the real is
contingent) beyond the model or representation. On another axis, it in-
vests power and authority in the model itself-the abstraction-giving
weight to the imaginary. Simulacrum conflates real and imaginary. The
idea of simulacrum, then, allows for an assessment of models and maps
on their own terms. In the context of the same-sex marriage debate, it
moves beyond the question of which forms of love are legitimate to a
8 See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, Simulacra and Simulations, in JEAN BAUDRILLARD: SE-
LECTED WRITINGS 166 (Mark Poster ed., 1988). The concept of simulacrum that Baudril-
lard uses differs significantly from the common use of the word "simulacrum" which is
defined as an image or likeness, a vague representation or a sham. See WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 1251 (3d college ed. 1988). Judge Posner
writes that registered partnership and homosexual cohabitation are "in effect a form of
contract that homosexuals can use to create a simulacrum of marriage." RICHARD A.
POSNER, SEX AND REASON 313 (1992). While Posner uses the word "simulacrum" to
describe imitation marriage for same-sex couples, this Note uses Baudrillard's work to
state that all marriage already operates in the absence of any distinction between real and
imitation-at the level of simulacrum.
9 28 U.S.C. § 1738c (1996). The DOMA codifies a definition of marriage as the union
of one man and one woman, and it permits states not to give effect to acts by any other
state that treats relationships between persons of the same sex as marriage. See id. It was
passed 342-67 in the House, see 142 CONG. Rc. D736 (daily ed. July 12, 1996); 84-14
in the Senate, see 142 CONG. REC. D912-02 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996); and it was signed
by President Clinton on September 21, 1996, see Melissa Healy, No Wedding Bell Blues
for Gay Couples, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at Al. The federal government has never
before officially defined marriage; definitions of marriage have always been determined
by the individual states. The Act was passed in reaction to the Hawaii circuit court decision
in Baehr, which declared that Hawaii did not demonstrate a compelling state interest in
denying homosexual couples the right to marry. See Baehr, 1996 WL 694235. Baehr marks
a significant move towards legalizing same-sex marriage in Hawaii.
10 BAUDRILLARD, supra note 8, at 168.
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question of how legitimacy is negotiated and how we might affect that
negotiation. It prompts simultaneous assessment of the existence of a real
beneath the rhetoric and of the power of imagination to effect social
change.
Congress's debate over the DOMA asserts a distinction between real,
heterosexual marriage-an event taking place daily, sanctioned by law, re-
peated infinitely throughout history, time-tested and true-and imaginary,
homosexual marriage-a fiction, an idea concocted by equal rights claimants
that in no way reflects the actual order of human society. Simulacra-se-
ries of copies with no original, "a metastable . . . descriptive machine
which provides all the signs of the real and short-circuits all its vicissi-
tudes"' 1 -operate in the gay marriage debate at multiple levels. When
marriage is considered as a simulacrum, a presentation of a system of
signs, distinctions between "real" heterosexual marriage and "imaginary"
homosexual marriage prove elusive and irrelevant. Then the real/ imaginary
distinction itself emerges as a simulacrum.
The DOMA implies that even unsanctioned imitation of a moral order
can threaten that order. As Baudrillard asks: "How can you punish the
simulation of virtue? Yet as such it is as serious as the simulation of crime.
Parody makes obedience and transgression equivalent, and that is the most
serious crime, since it cancels out the difference upon which the law is
based."12 The DOMA was passed with overwhelming, bipartisan support
even though same-sex marriage currently has not been legalized in any
U.S. state. 13 How can the legislature punish homosexual couples for simu-
lating marriage?14 Yet, if same-sex couples appear married, then how can
the law distinguish obedience and transgression in the moral realm? On
one level, this Note's application of the idea of simulacrum to the DOMA
debate can be read as an exploration of the extent to which the state's
power to administer law is staked upon its ability to produce oppositions
and external referentials in the face of simulacra.
To challenge the construction of heterosexual marriage as "real" is
not to say that all marriage is imaginary. Nor is the statement that homo-
sexual marriage is not "imaginary" an assertion that homosexual marriage
is "real." Rather, it is the proposed distinction between things real and
things imagined that is problematic. Politicians delineating the "real" in
terms of marriage-cognizable only in contrast to a correlative "imagi-
nary"-attach power and legitimacy exclusively to the real. Statements in
support of the DOMA situate the real/imaginary distinction in congruence
11Id. at 167.
121d. at 178.
13 See supra note 9.14 Sullivan states that conservatives should want same-sex marriage because it would
"buttress the ethic of heterosexual marriage, by showing how even those excluded from it
can wish to model themselves on its shape and structure." SULLIVAN, supra note 1, at 112.
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with binary oppositions such as biology/social construction, natural/fab-
ricated, and legitimate/illegitimate that link heterosexual marriage to the
natural and legitimate in production of a moral order. The real/imaginary
distinction perpetuates social inequality for bisexual, gay, and lesbian
people by casting different-sex marriage as real and same-sex marriage
as the artificial and unnatural creation of imaginative equal-rights advo-
cates. 15
However, I am not arguing here simply for expanding this domain of
the real in hopes of achieving legitimacy for homosexual couples through
their recurring performance of marriage. Just securing the right of same-
sex couples to marry would dilute the potential of a queer movement to
challenge more broadly gender roles confining all women and men. 16 The
same-sex marriage issue is not just about the denial of equal rights on the
one hand, or the need for a queer movement that emphasizes difference
rather than sameness between straight and gay people on the other. It is
about the privileging of marriage as the ultimate officiation of romance.
17
Erasing distinctions between "real" institutions and "imaginary" phe-
nomena reveals marriage as a simulacrum. Presenting marriage as a sys-
tem of signs that do not correspond to any external real undermines the
assumption that marriage, as a social institution, is necessarily desirable
or stable. If the privileging of marriage hinges (as it does in the DOMA
debate) on asserting that marriage is real in contrast to other, less legiti-
mate officiations of love, then simulacra remove the sine qua non of
marriage's peculiarity.
If the signs of marriage themselves do not translate into any actual
lifelong commitment to family, why is the state so invested in these signs?
The DOMA delineates the real in defense of the state's power to define
legitimacy. In doing so it protects the state's ability to administer law.
Both DOMA supporters and opponents generate distinctions in the pro-
duction of a moral order, portraying what they oppose as scandalous.
DOMA supporters denounce the scandal of homosexuality, infusing social
morality through legislation. DOMA critics denounce the scandal of pass-
ing legislation that threatens an unpopular minority, is constitutionally
questionable, and for which there is no imminent need, several weeks
before election time. They implicate politics as a simulacrum, asserting
in response a distinction between lawmaking that is proper or "legal" and
that which is purely "political," injecting a dose of political morality.' 8
Presenting the liberal opposition's response to DOMA supporters as also
'
5 For a discussion of how dominant terms or groups derive power from binary
opposition, see infra text accompanying notes 44-47.
16 See Ettlebrick, supra note 3, at 21; see also VAID, supra note 3, at 208.
171 assume that the current marriage debate is, at least in part, about how society
should treat romantic love between two people of the same sex.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 36-42.
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generated through simulacra undermines any misconception that the mar-
riage simulacrum is "imaginary" and what we need to do is "get real," as
DOMA opponents propose.
Understanding the pervasiveness of simulacra is a first step towards
envisioning different modes of equality. This Note proposes one possible
conception of equality: equality as equivalence of real and imaginary, as
multiple possibilities for romance without privileging. The concept of
simulacrum undermines binary oppositions such as real/imaginary, legiti-
mate/illegitimate, and natural/unnatural, which pervade the same-sex mar-
riage debate. Presenting equality as the equivalence of real and imaginary
then becomes an equalizing strategy. It seeks to avoid an alignment of
binary oppositions that perpetually locates sexual minorities on the un-
privileged, impure side of the dichotomy. It is a strategy to move equality
for people of different sexual orientations beyond analogy to a heterosex-
ual counterpart. It erodes the "on/off' quality of current legal marriage
that dictates that all couples are either married or unmarried, and that the
state of being married has some common social meaning. This mode of
equality takes the idea that the law produces the subjects it comes to
represent, and conceives of equality first in terms of the various legal
options for the officiation of romantic union themselves, rather than in
terms of categories of minority peoples. 19 It is an attempt to help the law
produce equal citizens. 20
I. The DOMA as a Strategy of the Real
The Defense of Marriage Act retaliates against the image of same-sex
couples displaying all accoutrements of marriage-an image murderous
to the conception of marriage as inexorably and immutably heterosexual.
Baudrillard states that "perhaps at stake has always been the murderous
capacity of images," and "to this murderous capacity is opposed the
dialectical capacity of representations as a visible and intelligible media-
tion of the real."' The DOMA is a legislative "strategy of the real,"
designed to deter homosexual legitimacy, waged with myths of origin and
the production of referentials.22
19 See infra text accompanying notes 50-54.
201 do not pretend here to have formulated a new conception of equality and a
proposal for effectuating it that is watertight. Rather, this piece is meant to provide a
framework for thinking about new modes of equality and how we might achieve them.21BAUDRILLARD, supra note 8, at 170. Mark Poster writes that in Simulacra and
Simulations, "[Baudrillard] has moved from the TV ad which, however, never completely
erases the commodity it solicits, to the TV newscast which creates the news if only to be
able to narrate it, or the soap opera whose daily events are both referent and reality for
many viewers." Mark Poster, Introduction to JEAN BAUDRILLARD: SELECTED WRITINGS,
supra note 8, at 6.
22 See BAUDRILLARD, supra note 8, at 171.
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In support of the DOMA, Senator Byrd declares: "Woe betide that
society that fails to honor that heritage and begins to blur that tradition
which was laid down by the Creator in the beginning .... Certainly we
do not want to launch further assault on the institution of marriage by
blurring its definition in this unwise way.' 23 In a similar vein, Senator Lott
states: "The Defense of Marriage Act is ... a response to an attack upon
the institution of marriage itself .... We should not have ambiguity in
this area. We should not have confusion."24 In response to this sentiment,
several liberal Senators ask: how can the institution of marriage be "as-
saulted" when no state has legalized same-sex marriage and the one
considering it is nowhere near rendering its final decision?25 The assault
lies in the "blurring" of the definition of marriage-in the capacity of
images of homosexual marriage to show that Byrd's vision of marriage
does not reference any external reality. The assault is ambiguity and
confusion over what marriage is.
On one level, by analogizing to Baudrillard and asking whether the
real itself could be "reduced to signs which attest [its] existence"' 26 one
can articulate precisely Byrd and Lott's fear. For "[t]hen the whole system
... [is a] simulacrum: not unreal, but a simulacrum, never again exchang-
ing for what is real, but exchanging in itself, in an uninterrupted circuit
without reference or circumference" 27 Byrd and Lott fear that perform-
ance of marriage by homosexual couples will reduce the real-heterosex-
ual marriage, "that tradition laid down by the Creator in the beginning"-
to mere signs without reference. They warn against extinction of a real
embodied by heterosexual marriage through perversion of its sacred form.
But the Senators' fear admits continuity between signs or repre-
sentations and the real they claim to mediate. If a mere claim to same-sex
marriage or a mere representation of marriage as befitting a homosexual
couple amounts to an assault on the institution itself, then marriage must
already operate at the level of simulacrum. It must already exist as an
"uninterrupted circuit" of images "without reference" to any substance or
actuality, but which "provides all the signs of' actual commitment and
"short-circuits all its vicissitudes"-the vast differences between mar-
2 142 CONG. REc. S10,110 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
24Md. at S10,101 (statement of Sen. Lott). Similar statements were also made in the
House. For example, Rep. Barr stated: "[M]arriage throughout the entire history of not
only our civilization but Western civilization has meant the legal union between one man
and one woman." 142 CONG. REc. H7275 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Barr). Likewise, Rep. McInnis appealed to "the long-held tradition that a marriage is
defined as a union between one man and one woman:' Id. at H7279 (statement of Rep.
Mclnnis).
25See generally 142 CONG. REc. S10,101 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (arguing that
consideration of this Act is premature).26 BAUDRILLARD, supra note 8, at 170.
27Id.
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riages and the impossibility, in fact the insult to romance, of ascribing
them consistent meaning. Some couples may consider their marriage a
codification of a blissful love, others a trap fostering various forms of
abuse; still others may be indifferent, having entered marriage for reasons
unrelated to love or family. Given the variety of the substance of individ-
ual marriage relationships, the institution of marriage can only be ac-
cessed collectively through a system of signs. Marriage, the social insti-
tution, becomes the repeated performance of ceremonies, dresses, rings,
and taxes. The marriage ceremony does not exchange for any promise of
real love or romance. It is the generation of a system of signs, exchanging
only in itself.
Senators Byrd, Coats, Nickles, and Gramm, to name four, combat the
notion of marriage as a system of signs with adamant insistence on the
real, with "a proliferation of myths of origin and signs of reality."28
Baudrillard observes: 'The only weapon of power, its only strategy against
this defection, is to reinject realness and referentiality everywhere. ' 29
According to Baudrillard: "This is . . . the phase that concerns us: a
strategy of the real . ..whose universal double is a strategy of deter-
rence."30 Senator Byrd identifies "the Creator" and the heritage "He" laid
down as the origin and the external referent around which the institution
of marriage is built. Similarly, Senator Coats invokes nature as marriage's
interminable source:
The definition of marriage is not created by politicians and
judges, and it cannot be changed by them. It is rooted in our
history, in our laws and our deepest moral and religious convic-
tions, and in our nature as human beings. It is the union of one
man and one woman. This fact can be respected, or it can be
resented, but it cannot be altered.31
Coats's statement names marriage itself as the real, as beyond legal or
social determination-so real it is part of nature itself. Heterosexual
marriage is a "fact" not to be confused with the fiction of altering the
definition of marriage. Coats endows marriage with the authority of law,
morality, religion, and human nature. Same-sex marriage is rendered
illegitimate in contrast-so incongruous to any reality that it is not even
possible. Senator Nickles took a similar approach, stating that "these
provisions simply reaffirm what is already known, what is already in
place' 32 Finally, Senator Gramm states:
28 Id. at 171.
291d. at 179.
301d. at 171.
31142 CONG. REc. S10,113 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Coats).
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The traditional family has stood for 5,000 years .... [It] has
always been important to civilization .... Human beings have
always given traditional marriage a special sanction. I do not
believe 5,000 years of recorded history have been in error. I
believe the traditional family-the union of man and woman,
upon which our entire civilization is based-is unique, and I
believe it is the foundation of our prosperity, our freedom, and
our happiness.33
Gramm creates referentiality by asserting the antiquity of marriage. Por-
traying "traditional marriage" as an unchanging fixture, he locates it on a
continuous and unbroken axis of time that serves as referent. Same-sex
marriage, then, appears in relief to this referent (time, the real) as a recent,
imaginary concoction with no basis in history, making no contribution to
civilization.
In the DOMA debate, the sanctity of heterosexual marriage is proved
by the alleged perversity of its antithesis: anti-marriage, gay marriage. It
is the threatening prospect of legalized same-sex marriage that makes this
whole presentation of the natural-ness and real-ness of marriage possible.
Baudrillard posits that strategies of the real are "always a question of
proving the real by the imaginary; proving truth by scandal; proving the
law by transgression; . . . proving the system by crisis . . . . Without
counting: proving theater by anti-theater; proving art by anti-art.. . 34
It is the "attack' the "assault" on marriage by the confusion of its
meaning that creates the need for the DOMA. In this sense, the real/imagi-
nary distinction itself can be understood as a simulacrum, emerging from
the constant exchange of the natural with the word of God with the
ancient with tradition with human nature with civilization, and so on "in
an uninterrupted circuit without reference or circumference. 35
II. Paying Homage to the Law
Given that the signs of marriage do not exchange for any actual
lifelong commitment, procreation, religious conviction, or love, what does
the state have at stake in these signs? Why must the signs be reinforced
at all costs against the "murderous capacity" of images? Through deline-
ating the real, the DOMA defends the state's power to define legitimacy,
to produce a moral order. The ability to articulate a moral order precedes
the power to differentiate between obedience and transgression, the dif-
32 d. at S10,103 (statement of Sen. Nickles).
33Id. at S 10,105-06 (statement of Sen. Gramm).34 BAUDRILLARD, supra note 8, at 176-77.351d. at 170.
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ference upon which the law is based. The state defends its ability to
administer law, to define obedience and transgression, in multiple ways.
In denunciating the scandal of homosexuality, DOMA supporters fuel the
marriage simulacrum and the idea of the real, paying homage to law's
ability to identify transgression in the name of social morality.
But defending the state's ability to enforce a moral order is not just
the work of DOMA supporters. DOMA opponents denounce the scandal
of passing such dubious legislation so near election time. They pay hom-
age to the legislative process, implicating the DOMA itself as a transgres-
sion of law, an order of political morality. Senator John Kerry states:
If this were truly a defense of marriage act, it would... provide
for counselling for all troubled marriages .... It would provide
treatment on demand for those with alcohol and substance abuse
.... It would expand the Violence Against Women Act. It would
guarantee day care for every family that struggles and needs it.36
Like the Act's supporters, DOMA opponents, too, lay claim to the real.
Much of the force of Senator Kerry's argument lies in its implication that,
in fact, the Republicans are the ones in fairyland.
DOMA opponents invoke proper legislative process as a referent to
erect a distinction between what is cynical "politics" and what is "legal.'
Senator Kerry, for example, aligns the political with "ugly" and "flawed,"
as opposed to legislation that displays the aesthetic and rational integrity
of law.37 He implies that politics and law can be separated just as his
opponents imply that the formal institution of marriage and its constrain-
ing reinforcement of gender roles can be separated.
A politics simulacrum-a politics/law distinction-again illustrates
the way in which the power of the state seems to depend on the capacity
of representations to mediate intelligibly the "real.' Both sides of the
DOMA debate invoke a moral superstructure, protecting their interests in
the pursuit of political power. "Capital" in Baudrillard's following state-
ment may be read to mean political capital or power: "The denunciation
of scandal always pays homage to the law .... Capital, which is immoral
and unscrupulous, can only function behind a moral superstructure, and
whoever regenerates this public morality (by indignation, denunciation,
etc.) spontaneously furthers the order of capital."38
Senator Kennedy chastises the DOMA as "a mean-spirited form of
Republican legislative gay-bashing cynically calculated to try to inflame
the public eight weeks before the November 5 election" 39 He notes that
36142 CONG. REc. S10,107 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
37 See id. at S10,107.
38 BAUDRILLARD, supra note 8, at 173.
39142 CONG. REc. S10,101 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
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"Federal law, which has never recognized same-sex marriages, hardly
needs clarification at this suspicious moment."40 Senator Moseley-Braun
states that "the Defense of Marriage Act is all about the politics of fear
and division and about inciting people in an area that is admittedly contro-
versial" 41 Likewise, Senator Kerry argues:
[T]his debate is fundamentally ugly, and it is fundamentally
political, and it is fundamentally flawed . . . . I suppose we
really should not be surprised that the U.S. Senate is spending
its time in an exercise of this kind, which ought to properly feed
the cynicism that already attaches to so much of what we do in
Washington.4 2
Similar to their conservative counterparts, these Senators attempt to rein-
ject referentiality and real-ness into a politics simulacrum. Kerry cries for
adherence to legislative process: he demands that the Senate honor the
law by enacting legislation that upholds constitutional principles, that is
worthy of the Senate's time, and that does not fuel divisive fires for no
"real" reason. The idea of proper legislative process serves here as a moral
superstructure which must be preserved to mask the unscrupulous force
of political capital.
I. The DOMA's Defense of Marriage
In defending the state's ability to delineate the real, produce a moral
order, and identify transgression of that moral order, the DOMA fulfills
its promise as a defense of marriage. Infusing referentiality and reality
everywhere, the DOMA does such a thorough job of defending marriage
that it leaves its opponents to protest in alternative terms: the denunciation
of political scandal, the claim to equal rights. The DOMA makes the
sanctity of marriage, the privileging of marriage, a risky target for dispute,
lest its opponents implicate themselves in the same project of producing
a moral order by erecting dubious distinctions in the wake of simulacra.
Reinjected with external referentials by the DOMA, the marriage
contract invites countless couples to enter it again and again, gaining
power by its repetition, taking pleasure in its serial presentation as the
natural, privileged relationship, not caring at all whether there is any love
involved. Marriage's desirability is perpetuated by a fetishization of its
form. The more times a person gets married and divorced, the better: there
will be that many more presentations, that many more waves in the
"irradiating synthesis of combinatory models in a hyperspace without
40 d. at S10,102.
411d. at S 10,104 (statement of Sen. Moseley-Braun).421d. at S10,107 (statement of Sen. Kerry).
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atmosphere. 43 Serial marriage and divorce become not the antithesis of
the idea of marriage, but its ultimate reinforcement. It is the repeat of-
fenders who invest the most privilege in marriage by subscribing to its
ability to legitimate love even though they have experienced first-hand its
inability to mediate substance.
The belief of the "left" that this institution can be made accommo-
dating by subjecting it to contemporary equal rights rules merely furthers
the privileging of marriage. Efforts to make the institution work for and
accommodate everyone create a system of deterrence by diverting the
question of why we continue to subscribe to the idea of marriage in the
first place.
IV. Exploring Modes of Equality
By asserting continuity between the real and the imaginary, the con-
cept of simulacrum challenges binaries such as law/politics, natural/un-
natural, and legitimate/illegitimate. As such, the idea of simulacrum chal-
lenges conceptual frameworks central to the perpetuation of inequality for
those associated with binaries' less privileged halves. Fixed oppositions
suppress the extent to which the things in opposition are interdependent,
deriving their meaning from contrast, rather than from innate antithesis.44
In its strategy of the real, the DOMA presents a fixed opposition between
real, different-sex marriage, and its fictive antithesis, same-sex marriage.
In so doing, the Act suppresses the extent to which the meaning that it
fuses into the idea of marriage is derived simply from contrast to same-
sex unions, rather than from any inherent substantive difference between
current marriage relationships and homosexual relationships.
The interdependence of terms in binary opposition is hierarchical,
with one term consistently dominant and prior to the other.45 Feminist and
philosopher Elizabeth Grosz explains: "[W]ithin these binary couples, the
primary or dominant term derives its privilege from a curtailment or
suppression of its opposite. Sameness or identity, presence, speech, the
origin, mind, etc. are all privileged in relation to their opposites, which
are regarded as debased, impure variants of the primary term."46 Grosz's
passage suggests that meaning is made through contrast: positive defini-
tions derive their meaning from the negation of their represented oppo-
sites.47 Set in this theoretical context, the DOMA can be read simply as
43 BAUDRILLARD, supra note 8, at 167.
44See Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of
Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 33, 37 (1988).
45See id.; see also JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak trans., Johns Hopkins University Press 1st Am. ed. 1976) (1976).
46 Elizabeth Grosz, Derrida, Irigaray, and Deconstruction, in LEFT-RIGHT INTERVEN-
TION 73 (1986), quoted in Scott, supra note 44, at 49 n.4.47See Scott, supra note 44, at 36-37.
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an infusion of meaning into the institution of marriage through the rep-
resentation of same-sex marriage as an opposing, impure variation of
form.
This reading of the DOMA again indicates that questioning why
marriage is considered desirable in the first place is a necessary concomi-
tant of any gay rights agenda. If same-sex couples are permitted to marry
legally, then gay rights proponents must be prepared for a second infusion
of meaning into marriage. We must be ready for representations of a
"lifestyle" or life choices that either implicitly or explicitly come to
contrast marriage, that become its next antithesis. My fears here are first,
the creation of a "model minority" of married gays and lesbians, resulting
in further marginalization of those who do not desire marriage; and sec-
ond, a false pretense of equality for people of minority sexual orientations
generally-a false sense that the battle to expand conceptions of gender
is over.
The idea of simulacrum also provides a different explanation of why
binary oppositions persist despite the elusiveness of actual referentials.
They persist because the power of the state itself appears contingent upon
the state's ability to produce moral orders, to reinject reality everywhere.
Revelation of the endless circuits of signs without reference or circum-
ference threatens the law itself by diluting our ability to distinguish
obedience and transgression. 48 One conclusion here could be that equal
rights is a tenable form of equality precisely because it preserves a frame-
work for distinguishing obedience and transgression, however limiting
that framework may be. Securing the right of same-sex couples to marry
is a goal that should not be abandoned. However, simply expanding access
to the institution of marriage without evaluating forces perpetuating mar-
riage's desirability undermines the potential of a queer social movement
to question traditional gender roles seriously.
49
In contrast, articulating equality as the equivalence of real and imagi-
nary, or as multiple possibilities for romance without privileging, is highly
experimental. However, this approach may produce greater equality among
people of differing sexual orientations in two important ways.
First, it is an attempt to formulate a conception of equality that does
not reinforce marriage's exclusive association with legitimacy. Forcing
couples to choose among various options in conferring legal status on
their relationship would put both heterosexual and homosexual couples in
the position of having to consider the desirability of various forms of
union. This in turn could foster greater acceptance of people's choice to
remain unmarried or to construct a non-traditional union. This is not just
a proposal to offer same-sex couples an alternative to legal marriage. It
48 See BAUDRILLARD, supra note 8, at 178.
49 See supra text accompanying notes 44-47 (explaining that dichotomies typically
privilege one of the binary opposites over the other).
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is a proposal to erode the "on/off' quality-the idea that people are either
married or unmarried, cut and dried-that current legal marriage implies
for all couples. Each of the various legal statuses, including different
forms of both marriage and domestic partnership, would be available to
everyone.
One possible way to effectuate this conception of equality might be
for states to offer all couples several forms of, and alternatives to, mar-
riage in endowing a relationship with legal consequences. 50 For example,
states could make a range of marriage agreements and partnership options
available to couples without regard to sex, restricting access to some of
the agreements and granting tax benefits on the basis of other, gender-
neutral criteria such as the length of time the couple has lived together or
whether the couple has custody of a child. 51 Like marriage, alternative
legal unions also could exist as simulacra. The goal here is to use the idea
of simulacrum to challenge binary oppositions pervading the same-sex
marriage debate and then to present multiple ways to legalize romantic
union as a potential strategy to avoid an alignment of binary oppositions
that relegates sexual minorities to binaries' less privileged sides.
Second, pursuing equality through alternative ways of legitimizing
romantic commitment can bypass identity politics by mediating equality
in terms of variant legal statuses themselves, rather than in terms of
categories of people. In other words, rather than conceiving of the indi-
vidual or minority group as the subject of equality, the legal statuses
themselves could function as the subjects among which equality must be
secured. Judith Butler's analysis of the subject sheds light on how offering
multiple forms of legal union could generate an equality that departs from
identity categories. Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, Butler
considers how the law produces the subjects it comes to represent. The
.5°Louisiana recently passed an act allowing couples to choose between "covenant
marriage" and "no-fault" marriage. Couples must certify that they have received counsel-
ing "emphasizing the nature and purpose of marriage and the responsibilities thereto" to
enter a covenant marriage and may obtain divorce only in limited situations such as
adultery, abuse, or after a two year separation. (Note that the act defines marriage as the
union of "one male and one female.") 1997 La. Acts 1380.
This Act has been considered a victory for the Christian right in their lobbying efforts
against no-fault divorce. See Katha Pollitt, What's Right About Divorce, N.Y. TIMEs, June
27, 1997, at A29; Kevin Sack, How Do You Say "I Do?": Christian Right Scores a
Legislative Coup In Crusade to Undermine No-Fault Divorce, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June
25, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. However, the Act does
make concrete the possibility of offering alternative forms of marriage or partnership.
51 Each of these cursory proposals has potential legal and social ramifications that need
exploration. For example, a proposed requirement that couples be granted the right to
marry only after successfully living together for a period of time would likely meet
objection from those whose religion or personal morality forbids them to live together
before marriage. These proposals are here merely to invite discussion of how different
forms of equality, separate from rights claimed through identity politics, might be
achieved.
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very idea that legalizing same-sex marriage would produce greater (even
if still limited) equality for homosexual people belies constitutive reci-
procity between the law and its subjects. Equality as multiple possibilities
for romance without privileging strategically harnesses this constitutive
reciprocity. It uses the law's power to produce the subjects it comes to
represent to move equality among people of different sexual orientations
beyond the realm of analogy to a heterosexual counterpart.
Butler posits that "there may not be a subject who stands 'before' the
law, awaiting representation in or by the law":5 2
Juridical notions of power appear to regulate political life in
purely negative terms-that is, through the limitation, prohibi-
tion, regulation, control and even "protection" of individuals
related to that political structure through the contingent and
retractable operation of choice. But the subjects regulated by
such structures are, by virtue of being subjected to them, formed,
defined, and reproduced in accordance with the requirements of
those structures. 53
Equality as equal rights presumes the subject to be an individual or
category of individuals standing before the law, striving to achieve equal-
ity within it. Ensuring equal rights can utilize the law's construction of
subjects by inspiring greater social acceptance of persons who attain
rights. But by presuming that the primary subject of equality is the
individual standing before the law, an equal-rights strategy locks the
pursuit of social equality into a chronological progression in which indi-
viduals claim membership in an identity group and present themselves to
the law as deserving of equal rights before the law's constitutive force is
acknowledged. The law's ability to produce the subjects it represents
comes into play too late. A category of minority -individuals has already
been delineated and forced to argue by analogy, 54 on some level forcedib"
claim sameness either to prior equal-rights claimants or to those who
currently hold the right sought. In the case of equal access to marriage,
the exclusive legitimacy of marriage already has been presumed and
reinforced; another group of people simply has gained access to it.
In contrast, equality as multiple possibilities for romance without
privileging harnesses the constitutive reciprocity between the law and its
52 BUTLER, supra note 7, at 2.
53 Id.54See, e.g., Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race:
The Implication of Making Comparisons between Racism and Sexism (or Other -Isms),
1991 DUKE L.J. 397 (arguing that the suggestion that one minority's, or individual's, harm
is similar to another's can cause' important differences in harmful experiences to seem
irrelevant).
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subjects up front. It softens an equal-rights strategy's assimilationist strain
by encouraging a transformation of ideas about marriage contemporane-
ous with its expansion to include sexual minorities. It is a strategy to help
the law construct equal individuals.
The idea of simulacrum enables us to understand the same-sex mar-
riage debate as the negotiation of a distinction between real and imagi-
nary, generated with attendant binary oppositions reinforcing the deline-
ated domains. As such, simulacrum advances the same-sex marriage debate
in two important ways. First, asserting equivalence of real and imagi-
nary-presenting marriage as a series of copies that does not reference
any external reality-challenges the sanctity of marriage, potentially un-
dermining its exclusiveness as the privileged officiation of love. Second,
exploring how social institutions are perpetuated, empowered, or debased
by the production of systems of signs illustrates how current inequalities
among people of different sexual orientations persist. The DOMA, waging
a strategy of the real with myths of origin, succeeding in defending
marriage against the murderous capacity of images, is an example of a
law designed to produce unequal subjects. Expanding the notion of the
subject of equality beyond the individual or group standing "before" the
law enables a vision of equality that does not reinforce minority catego-
ries.
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